As Paul mentioned in his first post, “we both were raised in fundamentalist communities, both were educated at the same conservative Christian university, and both have decided to pursue graduate training in American religious history.” As historians, we have been exposed to various philosophies of history. But as fundamentalists, we have also been taught a fundamentalist philosophy of history in sermons, Bible classes, Sunday schools, and in our own reading. My goal is to explain that fundamentalist philosophy historically, in order to identify the tension between our identities as fundamentalists and as historians.
The term philosophy of history has two meanings, depending on what one means by the word history.1 History can mean the researches of historians—inquiries into what happened in the past and how it can be explained. Philosophy of history then is an attempt to establish the philosophical assumptions of doing history and to deal with certain philosophic problems, such as causation and objectivity. It is a set of ground rules for historians.2 But history can also mean the pattern or progress of human events in the grand scale. Philosophy of history then is speculation about what pattern history takes or what meaning lies beneath events. This speculation is often as much concerned with future events, which will give the past meaning, as it is with historical events.3
With these two understandings of philosophy of history clear, we can refine our question about fundamentalism. We are actually asking two questions: What, if anything, does fundamentalism say about how history should be done? and What meaning or pattern do fundamentalists see in the events of history, both past and future? Fundamentalists devoted much effort to explaining their speculative philosophy of history (though not under that heading), so I’ll try to describe that first. But it is also possible to trace fundamentalist assumptions about history as an academic discipline.
Fundamentalism developed its philosophy of history in response to the fundamentalist-modernist controversy. According to George Marsden, the basic disagreement between fundamentalist and modernists was how God acted in history.4 Modernists thought that God acted in history through gradual, natural processes. The classic example is evolution, the idea that life developed and diversified over a long period from explainable, natural causes. Another example is geology, which explained the development of the earth through series of geologic ages. Outside of the sciences, liberal theology saw Christianity as the product of an evolutionary development of religion, from the monotheism of Moses to the ethics of the man Jesus. The Bible was regarded as a patchwork of texts from many different authors.
Fundamentalism, on the other hand, saw God directly intervening in history in supernatural ways. Life did not evolve gradually, but rather was directly created by God.5 Geology was not the product of ice ages, but of the catastrophic flood described in Genesis. The Bible, though written by human authors, is the divinely inspired Word of God, so that in it God speaks directly and supernaturally to men.
This supernaturalism led a distinct speculative philosophy of history. First, fundamentalism sees history as teleological, moving towards an end. God actively intervenes in history to bring about the redemption of man and the culmination of ages. This teleology is of course an inheritance from ancient Christian and Judaic traditions, but it is the foundation of a more specifically fundamentalist philosophy.
Second, the fundamentalist philosophy of history was premillennial.6 Premillennialism, saw the world “waxing worse and worse,” until it could be set right only by the direct intervention of God in the second coming of Christ. The second coming would be followed by the reign of the Lord Jesus for a thousand years, then by the culmination of the ages.
"The Seven Thousand Years of Human History," by Clarence Larkin
Third, the fundamentalist philosophy of history was dispensational. Drawing on its Baconian philosophy of science, it classified history into distinct eras. These eras were defined not by human actions but by the ways in which God intervenes in human history. For example, the dispensation of law was characterized by God giving the Mosaic law to Israel, and the dispensation of grace was characterized by God saving people through the work of Christ and gathering them into a church. Other indications of supernaturalism include the dividing of human history into seven thousand-year periods paralleling the creation week. Then too, the church age was divided further into seven periods, based on the letters in Revelation to the seven churches of Asia Minor. (See the two Clarence Larkin charts for illustrations of these dispensationalist classifications.)7
"The Messages to the Seven Churches," by Clarence Larkin
If fundamentalists derived their speculative philosophy of history from a commitment to supernaturalism, that same commitment led them to skepticism about the assumption of modern historiography. Modern historiography assumes that history can be explained as “natural cultural forces.”8 Fundamentalism believed that only the Bible can provide an accurate explanation of history—of the “signs of the times.” After all, if the dispensations or the premillennial return of Christ cannot be explained by natural causes, of what use is history as practiced by academics? Fundamentalists therefore discarded the entire philosophical apparatus which historians use in their discipline.
The questions that we face, then, are these: can we be fundamentalists and professional historians at the same time, or are the two approaches mutually exclusive? Do we regard history as the supernatural work of God, or as the product of natural, cultural forces and the choices of men? Can integrate faith and learning? It will be our goal in future posts to answer those questions.
- Compare William H. Dray, Philosophy of History, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 1-7. He terms the two types of philosophy of history critical (or analytic) and speculative. [↩]
- As an example of this first type of philosophy of history, see David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1971). [↩]
- Karl Marx’s speculations about history culminating in a proletarian revolution and a classless state are an example of this speculative philosophy of history, as is Augustine’s The City of God. [↩]
- This essay is heavily indebted to George Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), particularly Marsden’s discussions of fundamentalism and history on pages 62-72, 259-60. [↩]
- For example, the creed of my alma mater states, “I believe in . . . the creation of man by the direct act of God.” [↩]
- Fundamentalists tended to be premillennial and dispensationalist, but there were exceptions, most significantly J. Gresham Machen. [↩]
- The Clarence Larkin charts are in the public domain, and have been taken from http://www.preservedwords.com/charts.htm. [↩]
- The phrase is borrowed from Marsden, 259. [↩]
I think you guys are bringing up some interesting topics. Here’s my question, if I can word it correctly: how does fundamentalist philosophy of history handle things like the late 20th century social/cultural histories – namely, gender history? For example, I’m thinking specifically of one of the common topics in gender history, which is the distinction between sex as biologically constructed and gender as socially constructed.
I ask that because this segment stood out to me:
“Modern historiography assumes that history can be explained as “natural cultural forces.”[8] Fundamentalism believed that only the Bible can provide an accurate explanation of history—of the “signs of the times.” After all, if the dispensations or the premillennial return of Christ cannot be explained by natural causes, of what use is history as practiced by academics? Fundamentalists therefore discarded the entire philosophical apparatus which historians use in their discipline.”
I’m curious, then, as to how fundamentalist philosophy of history handles gender (and racial) history?
I think they often prefer not to. ;-)
Seriously though, it depends on the narrative arc a particular fundamentalist prefers. Lincoln focused on the dominant fundamentalist narrative, the declension narrative popular among theological dispensationalists. Basically, your garden variety dispensational church historian believes that the post-Biblical church age is the history of the decline and fall of man. In this narrative fundamentalists are prone to focus on the radicalism of the women’s suffrage movement (ie. the heterodoxy of Elizabeth Cady Stanton) and interpret feminism (broadly conceived) as an attack on Biblical norms and further proof of the decline of cultural morality. Race is a bit trickier for the dispensational fundamentalist since in the past many were anti-semitic and racist (see Arno Gaebelein’s “Conflict of the Ages”) on the basis of their eschatological views and theory of history. Today of course, most dispensationalists would decry racism.
But postmillenial fundamentalists are likely to interpret the story of history as an ascension narrative. Often these fundamentalists are theologically reformed. This postmillenialist narrative of history is progressive; the postmillenialist posits that the church will usher in the millenial kingdom of Christ, slowly, but surely, transforming culture until Christ returns. This is the opposite of the dispensationalist who sees history ending in an apocalypse! To the point of your question though, the postmillenialist fundamentalist is likely to see women’s rights and abolitionism as proof of an upward moral progression in history.
The best two books on the topic that I’ve encountered recently are Margaret Bendroth’s “Fundamentalism and Gender: 1875 to the Present” and Leo Ribuffo’s “The Old Christian Right.” I should note that historically many fundamentalists did support women’s rights and opposed anti-semitism and racism. I suspect that many fundamentalists were not exceptional from the rest of society in that they adhered to cultural rather than Biblical norms. Some interpreted Scripture to fit their cultural and political beliefs rather than vice versa. To cite a statement from our alma mater: “We conformed to the culture rather than provide a clear Christian counterpoint to it.”
So far Lincoln and I are simply setting the stage for how fundamentalists often view history. Stay tuned as we hope to provide our own historical philosophies in continuity and contrast with the “typical” fundamentalist view. :-)
[Revision: 7/9/09 - Rereading your question, Tanya, I think you were asking specifically about how fundamentalist historians use gender and race as tools of historical analysis. The short answer is that they usually don't. Why? Well, it's just guesswork, but I'd first point to the fundamentalist prelediction for intellectual history. Fundamentalists emphasize that internal belief determines external practice, that what we believe informs our actions. So it's not surprising then that fundamentalist historians tend toward intellectual history. Gender and race as categories of analysis have instead emerged from the social history current over the past forty years. I also suspect that fundamentalist historians have been leery of embracing gender and race as analytic tools because those tools were first developed by the ideological left. So, for example, since gender analysis has been closely tied with feminism, fundamentalists have avoided it. But I see no inherent reason why fundamentalists should not employ gender and race in their histories, though as far as I am aware I do not know of a fundamentalist historian who has.]
I’m glad for Paul’s response to Tanya’s question. It’s more detailed and better informed than one I could have given. I’ll just add a few observations.
First, whenever fundamentalism defines its philosophy of history, it is nearly always a speculative philosophy of history, not a critical philosophy of history. Speculative philosophy has little to do with gender and racial history, since those questions would usually fit better with a critical philosophy of history.
Second, the fundamentalist philosophy of history that I’ve described is usually articulated by pastors and theologians, not by historians. That also means that gender history dealt with by fundamentalists.
That said, I don’t know that there is any clearly defined philosophy of history dealing with gender that could be labeled fundamentalist. It would depend on the historian. Paul has given some good explanations of what the options are, though.
It seems like believing that God intervenes supernaturally in history is distinct from being able to recognize when or how he has. When God hardened Pharaoh’s heart against the Israelites, without the specific revelation to that effect even a good fundamentalist historian could describe only the proximate cause of Pharaoh’s actions and their consequences. While I’ve known some fundamentalists to point to the sinking of the Spanish Armada, for example, as God’s intervening on behalf of the Reformation, I’m not sure how such an opinion could claim to be more than speculation.
So wouldn’t a fundamentalist historian, rather than discarding the secular historian’s “entire philosophical apparatus,” just supplement it with a belief in God’s supernatural work, in general? Sort of like a theistic evolutionist: the scholarly work doesn’t look any different, but it comes a gloss of spirituality.
I agree completely with your first sentence, Austin. That’s exactly the point that I’m going to try to make when I articulate my own philosophy of history in a later post.
I also agree that a fundamentalist historian could combine their professional approach to history with a belief in the supernatural, just as you’ve described. In fact, that’s probably the default approach for fundamentalist and evangelical historians. I hope, though, that faith and scholarship can be better integrated than that. Again, I’ll make an attempt at that in a later post.
But I do think that plenty of fundamentalists point to specific historical events as being the direct providential intervention of God, without credit to natural or cultural causes. Here are a few events that I have heard described that way, just off the top of my head: the sinking of the Spanish Armada, the Battle of Dunkirk, Washington’s crossing of the Delaware, the election of George W. Bush, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the founding of Jamestown, and I’m sure there are more. The way I hear those events described from the pulpit (not from historians), they are considered obvious, not speculative, examples of providence. For more examples, see this collection of articles from the Vision Forum.
Of course, I offer those examples as being descriptive, not normative.
Clarence Larkin lived in Fox Chase, PA when he made those charts (see the imprint in the lower lefthand corner). He pastored Bethany Baptist Church at 460 Rhawn Street which, ironically, happens to be 1.6 miles away from my apartment on the same street.
Very interesting! Does that church building still stand? If it does, perhaps you can get a tour and some photographs for our “historical sites” category.
I find it unfortunate that a fundamentalist philosophy of history is by definition dispensational. I do not believe this reflects the roots of fundamentalism. Even the BJU creed only speaks of the bodily return of Christ and not the millennium or the timing of Christ’s return. Bob Jones Jr. in his booklet “Fundamentals of the Faith” (this is a brief examination of the BJU creed) made it clear that the details of escatology were areas of disagreement among good men and those distinctions should not be part of the creed. In short, I don’t believe dispensationalism (or premillennialism) should be elevated to a fundamental doctrine and it represents a weakness in fundamentalism’s philosophy of history.
As a believer in “The Fundamentals” I can certainly ascribe to the first point of supernaturalism. I would add to that God’s sovereignty in history. My personal philosophy of history would also include both redemptive and covenantal aspects of God’s dealing with man.
Dean,
I don’t mean to “define” a fundamentalist philosophy of history as dispensational, just to “describe” it as dispensational. In this post I’m attempting to describe generally the fundamentalist philosophy of history, not to say that fundamentalists necessarily were (or necessarily must be) dispensationalist.
I make several generalizations in this post, and of course some are more certain than others. For example, I generalize that fundamentalists make a large role for the supernatural in their philosophy of history. I think that’s a generalization that’s virtually certain. On the other hand, I generalize that fundamentalists are premillennial and dispensationalist. This is a generalization that can only be made with big caveats. As Paul and I have both remarked, there were (and are) many fundamentalists who are postmillennial. And even among premillennial fundamentalists, there are many who are not dispensationalists.
So why, then, did I choose to generalize that fundamentalists are dispensationalists? From a purely academic perspective, premillennialism is a very strong influence on fundamentalism. I daresay that the majority of fundamentalists have been premillennialists. Certainly the BJU creed is deliberately ambiguous on this point. However, that creed was written in the 1920s. Since that point, most fundamentalists have become more definitive in their adherence to dispensationalism. Again, that’s a generalization, and not a particularly nuanced one.
But my second reason for describing fundamentalists as dispensationalist is more personal. That is the strain of fundamentalism that has particularly influenced me. So, since the aim of this post is lay the groundwork for describing my own philosophy of history, I choose to focus on that part of fundamentalism.
In short, this post is descriptive, not normative. I’m describing what fundamentalists (in general) are like, not what they should be like. Over the next couple weeks as we lay out our personal philosophies of history, I suspect that you and I will mostly agree. We look forward to interacting with you about that as well.
Thanks for the clarification. I certainly look forward to your future posts.
(I know this is a late response—-I’m trying to catch up with you guys.)
If we (Christians) cannot integrate faith and learning, then we’ve failed in the dominion mandate (from Creation). That’s my short answer to the that question. I am working on a longer answer. That, though, is the start of my answer to the other questions as well. (Austin’s first sentence is exactly right. Well said!!)
I do tend to agree with Austin, but I’m still uncomfortable with the end result: a dichotomy between divine intervention and human action. I was raised in the home of a believing, analytical chemist. My father had no problem acknowledging divine intervention, but he believed that God mostly chose to intervene in human events using natural means. Natural processes like chemical reactions and the laws of thermodynamics are as clear evidence of God’s divine intervention as any “Protestant Wind.” (Funny that fundamentalist historians might be more at ease claiming the destruction of the Spanish Armada as divine intervention than they would be embracing Pat Robertson’s claims that Hurrican Katrina represented divine judgement! Perhaps we should call it the “Evangelical Gust”…)
I do not wish to model my practice of history after the practice of science by theistic evolutionists. The newly appointed Director of the National Institutes of Health, Francis Collins, essentially subsumes Scripture beneath science. Whenever the two appear to conflict he is quick to back the interpretation of the mainstream scientific community.
So I feel stuck between a rock (an essentially secular approach to history) and a hard place (simplistic, Whiggish Christian narratives). I suppose I would be more likely to integrate Scripture into history when explaining historical actions rather than in judging historical causes. For example, a Christian historian can adopt a condemnatory tone toward the lies of Richard Nixon without using historical events to judge the man. I do not believe that the lesson to be learned from Watergate is that “Nixon reaped what he sowed.” He sinned, and we can point that out, but his punishment is in God’s hands, not ours. We should not interpret (or twist!) historic events to punish vice and reward virtue.
John Fea wrote this op-ed for the Houston Chronicle that touches on the weakness of historical narratives that are shaped to heroize Christianity.
I’m just amazed that two bright young men would focus all their energy on a topic like “Fundamentalism’s philosophy of history.” I’m being perfectly blunt here– who really cares? One of the problems with Christian fundamentalism is its crippling habit of living in the past and focusing on the people, culture, and thoughts of the past. And while I know that an understanding of the past is essential to a vision for the future, I believe that discussion like this are the reason that Christianity has become stagnant– a theology to be discussed rather than a faith to be lived. We should be looking at the people and culture and beliefs of today, understanding rather than judging them, and seeking to befriend rather than analyze them. When a Christian views an unbeliever only as a potential convert, the unbeliever senses that and reacts negatively. We should want to befriend people because they are human beings with intrinsic worth, not because we are angling for a convert. When we witness, it should be because we truly care. These long discussions on dry, dusty minor points of theology stand in the way of vibrant, vital Christianity.